Axiomatizing provable $n$-provability by Kolmakov, Evgeny & Beklemishev, Lev
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
00
38
1v
1 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  1
 M
ay
 20
18
Axiomatizing provable n-provability∗
Evgeny Kolmakov Lev D. Beklemishev
Steklov Mathematical Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences
Gubkina str. 8, Moscow, Russia
kolmakov-ea@yandex.ru bekl@mi.ras.ru
May 2, 2018
Abstract
A formula ϕ is called n-provable in a formal arithmetical theory S if ϕ is provable in
S together with all true arithmetical Πn-sentences taken as additional axioms. While in
general the set of all n-provable formulas, for a fixed n > 0, is not recursively enumerable,
the set of formulas ϕ whose n-provability is provable in a given r.e. metatheory T is r.e.
This set is deductively closed and will be, in general, an extension of S. We prove that these
theories can be naturally axiomatized in terms of progressions of iterated local reflection
principles. In particular, the set of provably 1-provable sentences of Peano arithmetic PA can
be axiomatized by ε0 times iterated local reflection schema over PA. Our characterizations
yield additional information on the proof-theoretic strength of these theories (w.r.t. various
measures of it) and on their axiomatizability. We also study the question of speed-up of
proofs and show that in some cases a proof of n-provability of a sentence can be much shorter
than its proof from iterated reflection principles.
Keywords: strong provability predicate, reflection principle, Peano arithmetic, Turing pro-
gression
1 Introduction
A lot of recent work on provability logic and its applications to the analysis of systems of arith-
metic involves the notion of n-provability. An arithmetical formula ϕ is called n-provable in
a formal theory T whose language contains that of Peano arithmetic if ϕ is provable in T to-
gether with all true arithmetical Πn-sentences taken as additional axioms. Another notion of
n-provability has also been considered in the literature, where ϕ is called n-provable if ϕ is prov-
able in T using first order logic and one application of the omega-rule stated for Σn−1-formulas
(cf [17]). The two notions coincide only for n = 1, however the former is simpler and more useful
for applications, so n-provability will only refer to that notion in the present paper.
The set of n-provable formulas of a (sound) r.e. theory T is Σn+1-complete and is expressible
by an arithmetical Σn+1-formula usually denoted [n]T (x). This formula (provably in T ) shares
the main properties of the usual Go¨del’s provability predicate, that is, Lo¨b’s derivability con-
ditions, therefore the standard proof of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem also works for
n-provability. Hence, if a theory T is n-consistent, its n-consistency is not n-provable.
∗Research financed by a grant of the Russian Science Foundation, project No. 14-50-00005.
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The sentence ¬[n]T (p⊥q) expressing the n-consistency of T is also known to be equivalent
to the uniform reflection principle for Σn-formulas, RFNΣn(T ). This connects the study of n-
provability to the theory of transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic systems based on
iteration of reflection principles that originated in the works of Turing [19] and Feferman [8].
In provability logic, the notion of n-provability emerged in the work of C. Smoryn´ski (see [18])
who characterized GL as the provability logic of the n-provability predicate. Konstantin Ig-
natiev [9], following Giorgi Japaridze [10], axiomatized the polymodal provability logic GLP of
the n-provability predicates taken together for all n ∈ ω.
The notion of n-provability later found several interesting applications in the study of frag-
ments of PA. It was used to characterize the fragments of arithmetic defined by parameter free
induction [2] and to study their properties such as complexity of axiomatization, the classes of
provably total computable functions, etc. The notion of n-provability and the modal logic GLP
also played a prominent role in the approach to the ordinal analysis of systems of arithmetic
based on provability algebras [4, 5].
While the set of all n-provable formulas (for n > 0) is in general not recursively axiomati-
zable, the set of formulas ϕ for which [n]Sϕ is provable in the ordinary sense in a given (r.e.)
metatheory T is a recursively enumerable set. This set is deductively closed and will be, in
general, an extension of S (denoted CnS (T ) below). We are interested in obtaining a natural
recursive axiomatization of such a theory and to better understand its properties such as how
strong it is compared to T and to S and whether it is finitely axiomatizable. For example, what
is the theory C1
PA
(PA)?
We notice that C0
PA
(PA) has the same set of theorems as PA. However, by Parikh’s theorem
there is a non-provably recursive speed-up between PA and C0
PA
(PA). The case n = 0 is an
exception, and for all n > 0 the theories CnS (T ) are, in general, strictly stronger than S.
The answers that we obtain are formulated in terms of progressions of iterated local reflection
principles. For example, we show that C1S(PA) is equivalent to ε0 times iterated local reflection
schema over S. More generally, it turns out that the number of times the local reflection schema
needs to be iterated to axiomatize the theory C1S(T ) is related to the so-called Σ
0
2-ordinal of T
introduced in [6]. We also obtain more general characterizations of theories CnS (T ) for n > 1 in
terms of iterations of relativized local reflection principles.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief summary of basic notions and
the notation used in this paper. In Section 3 we introduce the theories CnS (T ) and prove several
basic results related to them. Section 4 is devoted to the axiomatization of the theory C1S(EA),
which is the base case for our study. In Section 5 we are dealing with the same problem for the
extensions of EA and obtain our main axiomatization results for the case of 1-provability. We
obtain the relativization of these results to the case of n-provability for n > 1 in Section 6. In
Section 7 we prove that the natural axiomatization of C1
EA
(EA) has superexponential speed-up
over the axiomatization EA+ Rfn(EA) and obtain related results for provable n-provability.
The question studied in this paper emerged in discussions with Volodya Shavrukov and was
suggested by some (unpublished) results of Mingzhong Cai [7] (cf. Proposition 3.1 in this paper).
We are grateful for their valuable input.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper we deal with first-order theories in the language of arithmetic. As a basic theory
we take Elementary Arithmetic EA (sometimes denoted as I∆0(exp)), that is, the first-order
theory formulated in the language 0, (·)′,+,× extended by the unary function symbol exp for the
exponentiation function 2x. It has standard defining axioms for these symbols and the induction
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schema for all bounded formulas in this language. As usual, ϕ is a bounded formula if it contains
only bounded quantifiers. The class of all bounded formulas in the language introduced above is
denoted by ∆0(exp), and we also call such formulas elementary. We denote by EA
+ the extension
of EA by the axiom asserting the totality of the superexponential function 2xy .
If we allow induction for all arithmetical formulas the resulting theory is Peano Arithmetic
denoted by PA. The fragment of PA obtained by restricting the induction schema to Σn-formulas
is denoted by IΣn. By IΣ
−
n we denote the theory of parameter free induction for Σn-formulas.
It is clear that the sequence of theories {IΣn | n < ω} is monotone and PA =
⋃
n<ω IΣn. We
also consider the theories BΓ and LΓ and their parameter free versions BΓ− and LΓ−, where Γ
is some class of arithmetical formulas (see, e.g., [11]).
We assume the standard arithmetization of syntax and go¨delnumbering of syntactic objects.
In particular, we write pϕq for the (numeral of the) go¨delnumber of ϕ. We consider r.e. extensions
of EA and assume that each theory T comes with an elementary formula σT (x), defining the set
of axioms of T in the standard model. Using this formula one can naturally construct the formula
PrfT (x, y) representing the relation “x codes a T -proof of the formula with go¨delnumber y”. Then
the standard provability predicate for T is given by ∃xPrfT (x, y), and we denote this formula by
✷T (y). We often write ✷Tϕ instead of ✷T (pϕq). Also we allow quantification over sentences or
formulas in a natural way, e.g., ∀ϕ I(ϕ) is a shorthand for ∀x (Sent(x)→ I(x)), where Sent(x) is
an elementary formula defining the set of all go¨delnumbers of the arithmetical sentences.
If every theorem of T is a theorem of U we write T ⊆ U . The formalization of this statement
in arithmetic is given by ∀ψ (✷Tψ → ✷Uψ). By T ≡ U we mean that both inclusions T ⊆ U
and U ⊆ T hold, that is, T and U are deductively equivalent. If the above conditions hold only
for the formulas in some class Γ we write T ⊆Γ U and T ≡Γ U , respectively.
It is known that for n > 0 classes Πn have partial truth definitions. Namely, for each n > 0
there exists an arithmetical Πn-formula TrueΠn(x) such that for every Πn-formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
EA ⊢ ∀x1 . . . ∀xn (ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)↔ TrueΠn(pϕ(x1, . . . , xn)q)),
where the bar notation pϕ(x)q stands for the EA-definable term, representing the elementary
function that maps n to pϕ(n¯)q, where n¯ is the term 0
′...′ with n successor symbols. Using this
formula we can formalize the notion of n-provability. We denote by [n]T the provability predicate
for the theory T together with all true Πn-sentences taken as additional axioms. This predicate
can be represented in arithmetic using the corresponding partial truth definition as follows:
[n]Tϕ := ∃z (TrueΠn(z) ∧ ✷T (TrueΠn(z)→ ϕ)) .
It is known that [n]T satisfies Lo¨b’s derivability conditions provably in EA (cf [18, 5]):
1. If T ⊢ ϕ, then EA ⊢ [n]Tϕ.
2. EA ⊢ [n]T (ϕ→ ψ)→ ([n]Tϕ→ [n]Tψ).
3. EA ⊢ [n]Tϕ→ [n]T [n]Tϕ.
Point 3 follows from the general fact, known as provable Σn+1-completeness :
EA ⊢ ∀x1 . . . ∀xn (σ(x1, . . . , xm)→ [n]Tσ(x1, . . . , xm)),
whenever σ(x1, . . . , xm) is a Σn+1-formula.
We write 〈n〉Tϕ for ¬[n]T¬ϕ. The formula 〈n〉T⊤ represents n-consistency of a theory T and
is known to be equivalent to the uniform reflection principle for Σn-formulas
RFNΣn(T ) : ∀x (✷Tϕ(x¯)→ ϕ(x)) , ϕ ∈ Σn.
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The union of all schemata RFNΣn(T ) for n > 0, that is, the full uniform reflection schema, is
denoted RFN(T ).
The local reflection principle for T is the following schema
Rfn(T ) : ✷Tϕ→ ϕ, ϕ a sentence.
If we impose the restriction ϕ ∈ Γ for some class of formulas Γ, then we obtain the partial reflec-
tion principle denoted by RfnΓ(T ). Relativized local reflection principles are defined analogously,
but with [n]T instead of ✷T . For instance, Rfn
n
Γ(T ) denotes the schema
[n]Tϕ→ ϕ, ϕ ∈ Γ.
We say that (D,≺) is an elementary linear ordering if there is a pair of elementary formulas
D(x) and x ≺ y such that EA proves that (D,≺) is a linear ordering. It is an elementary
well-ordering, if ≺ is a well-ordering of {n ∈ N | N |= D(n)} in the standard model of arithmetic.
We consider transfinite iterations of the reflection schemata mentioned above along an arbi-
trary elementary well-ordering (D,≺). We follow the treatment of iterated reflection principles
presented in [3]. Assuming R(T ) is one of the reflection schemata for T a transfinite progression
(R(T ))α∈D is defined by formalizing the following fixed-point equation:
R(T )α ≡ T + {R(R(T )β) | β ≺ α}. (1)
More formally, let σT (x) be an elementary numeration of a theory T . Fix an elementary formula
AxR(x, y) such that for each elementary formula τ(x) the formula AxR(x, pτq) numerates the
schema R(U), where U is the theory numerated by τ . W.l.o.g. we may also assume that
EA ⊢ ∀x, y (AxR(x, y)→ x > y). (2)
Consider an elementary formula ρ(α, x) defined by the following fixed-point equation:
EA ⊢ ∀α∀x (ρ(α, x)↔ (σT (x) ∨ ∃β ≺ αAxR(x, pρ(β¯, x)q))). (3)
Note that β 6 pβq 6 pρ(β¯, x)q, whence the quantifier for β can be bounded by x in view of
condition (2). The formula ρ(α, x) thus constructed numerates a parametrized family of theories
that we denote R(T )α and that provably satisfies equation (1).
We write (T )nα for RFNΣn(T )α and Tα for Con(T )α, the αth member of the progression of
iterated consistency assertions. The following lemma essentially due to Ulf Schmerl [16] provides
a useful tool for reasoning about transfinite iterations inside weak theories such as EA.
Lemma 2.1 (reflexive induction). For any elementary linear ordering (D,≺), any theory T
extending EA is closed under the following rule:
∀α (✷T ∀β ≺ αϕ(β)→ ϕ(α))
∀αϕ(α)
.
Using this lemma it can be shown that the sequence of theories (R(T )α)α∈D is unique mod-
ulo provable equivalence in EA. For more details on reflection principles and their transfinite
iterations see [3].
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3 Provable n-provability
Given a natural number n > 0 and a pair of theories T and S, define the following set of formulas
CnS (T ) := {ϕ | T ⊢ [n]Sϕ}.
Since [n]S satisfies Lo¨b’s derivability conditions, C
n
S (T ) is a deductively closed set extending
S. Note that CnS (T ) can be viewed as a theory with the provability predicate ✷T [n]S . In
particular, CnS (T ) ⊆ U is a shorthand for ∀ψ (✷T [n]Sψ → ✷Uψ). Also notice that T ⊆ U implies
CnS (T ) ⊆ C
n
S (U). We start with several simple facts about the theories C
n
S (T ).
The following basic result is due to Mingzhong Cai [7, Proposition 5.5] (unpublished), who
considered the set of all formulas ϕ provably n-provable in a theory T for some n ∈ N, that is,
the theory C∞T (T ) :=
⋃
n∈N C
n
T (T ). We include this result with a short direct proof.
Proposition 3.1 (M. Cai). C∞T (T ) ≡ T + RFN(T ).
Proof. Since T ⊢ ϕ implies T ⊢ ✷Tϕ, we obtain T ⊆ C
∞
T (T ). Now, RFN(T ) is equivalent to the
theory axiomatized by {〈n〉T⊤ | n ∈ N}. For each n we have
T ⊢ [n]T⊥ → [n+ 1]T⊥
→ [n+ 1]T 〈n〉T⊤.
By provable Σn+2-completeness, since 〈n〉T⊤ is Πn+1, we derive
T ⊢ 〈n〉T⊤ → [n+ 1]T 〈n〉T⊤,
whence T ⊢ [n+ 1]T 〈n〉T⊤ and 〈n〉T⊤ ∈ C
∞
T (T ). This proves T + RFN(T ) ⊆ C
∞
T (T ).
To show the converse, assume T ⊢ [n]Tϕ for some n ∈ N. Fix an arbitrary m > n such that
ϕ ∈ Πm+1. Using provable Σm+1-completeness we derive
T ⊢ [n]Tϕ ∧ ¬ϕ→ [n]Tϕ ∧ [m]T¬ϕ
→ [m]Tϕ ∧ [m]T¬ϕ
→ [m]T⊥,
whence T ⊢ 〈m〉T⊤ → ([n]Tϕ → ϕ). Combining it with T ⊢ [n]Tϕ, we obtain T + 〈m〉T⊤ ⊢ ϕ.
It follows that T + RFN(T ) ⊢ ϕ, hence C∞T (T ) ⊆ T + RFN(T ).
In this paper we study a more delicate question of characterizing the theories CnS (T ) for a
fixed n > 0. As a first simple observation we show that such theories are not sensitive to the
extension of T by axioms weaker than RFNΠn(S).
Proposition 3.2. For every sentence ψ and every Πn+1-sentence pi,
(i) CnS (T + 〈n〉Sψ) ⊆ C
n
S (T ) + ψ.
(ii) CnS (T + pi) ⊆ C
n
S (T ) + pi.
Proof. Note that (ii) follows from (i) by provable Σn+1-completeness. Indeed, since ¬pi is Σn+1,
we have T ⊢ ¬pi → [n]S¬pi or, equivalently, T + 〈n〉Spi ⊢ pi, and by the monotonicity of C
n
S (·)
operator and (i) it yields CnS (T + pi) ⊆ C
n
S (T + 〈n〉Spi) ⊆ C
n
S (T ) + pi.
Now let us prove (i). Assume T + 〈n〉Sψ ⊢ [n]Sϕ for some ϕ. Clearly, T +¬〈n〉Sψ ⊢ [n]S¬ψ.
Both [n]Sϕ and [n]S¬ψ imply [n]S(ψ → ϕ), whence T ⊢ [n]S(ψ → ϕ), that is, (ψ → ϕ) ∈ C
n
S (T ).
It follows that CnS (T ) + ψ ⊢ ϕ.
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Corollary 3.3. CnS (T + 〈n〉S⊤) ≡ C
n
S (T ).
It is well-known by the results of D. Leivant [13] and H. Ono [14] that IΣn ≡ EA+ 〈n+1〉EA⊤
(cf also [3]). Hence we obtain
Corollary 3.4. Cn+1S (EA) ≡ C
n+1
S (IΣn).
The following lemma shows that the theories CnS (T ) are strictly stronger than S.
Lemma 3.5. Provably in EA, S + Rfnn(S) ⊆ Cn+1S (T ).
Proof. Arguing in EA assume S + Rfnn(S) ⊢ ϕ. We get a sequence of sentences ψ1, . . . , ψn such
that
EA ⊢ ✷S
(
n∧
i=1
([n]Sψi → ψi)→ ϕ
)
.
Since EA ⊢ ∀ψ (✷Sψ → [n+ 1]Sψ), we have
EA ⊢ [n+ 1]S
(
n∧
i=1
([n]Sψi → ψi)→ ϕ
)
.
If we show that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds that EA ⊢ [n + 1]S ([n]Sψi → ψi), then from
the previous derivation we obtain EA ⊢ [n + 1]Sϕ and we get the required result since T is an
extension of EA. We derive
EA ⊢ [n]Sψi → [n+ 1]Sψi
→ [n+ 1]S([n]Sψi → ψi)
The sentence ¬[n]Sψi is Πn+1, so we have
EA ⊢ ¬[n]Sψi → [n+ 1]S (¬[n]Sψi)
→ [n+ 1]S([n]Sψi → ψi),
whence EA ⊢ [n+ 1]S([n]Sψi → ψi).
It also answers the question concerning the axiomatization complexity of the theories CnS (T ).
By the Unboundedness theorem of Kreisel and Le´vy [12] (cf also [5, Corollary 2.22]) we obtain
Corollary 3.6. For each n > 0 the theory CnS (T ) is of unbounded arithmetical complexity. In
particular, it is not finitely axiomatized.
4 Provable in EA 1-provability
Recall that the operator CnS (·) is monotone w.r.t. the inclusion of theories and that we consider
theories extending EA. So, the theory C1S(EA) is in some sense the base case for our investigations.
In this section we characterize this theory in terms of the local reflection principle over S. For
convenience we write CS(T ) for C
1
S(T ) throughout the paper.
Lemma 4.1. Provably in EA+, CS(EA) ≡ S + Rfn(S).
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Proof. The inclusion S + Rfn(S) ⊆ CS(EA) follows from Lemma 3.5. We focus on the converse
inclusion. In this proof we will consider EA stated as a quantifier-free theory in the language with
the terms for all elementary functions. Such a theory is known to be definitionally equivalent to
the original formulation of EA (cf [3]).
Assume EA ⊢ [1]Sϕ. Let ∀x δ(x, z), where δ(x, z) is a bounded formula, be a Π1-formula that
is EA-equivalent to TrueΠ1(z). By the definition of [1]Sϕ the assumption implies
EA ⊢ ∃p ∃z ∀x (δ(x, z) ∧ PrfS(y, p∀x δ(x, z)→ ϕq)).
We apply a version of Herbrand’s theorem for Σ2-formulas (which can be formalized in EA
+) to
the derivation above. Thus, we obtain a sequence of terms t0, p0, t1(x1), p1(x1), . . . , tk(x1, . . . , xk),
pk(x1, . . . , xk) such that the following disjunction is provable in EA:
δ(x1, t0) ∧ PrfS(p0, p∀x δ(x, t0)→ ϕq) ∨
δ(x2, t1(x1)) ∧ PrfS(p1(x1), p∀x δ(x, t1(x1))→ ϕq) ∨
δ(x3, t2(x1, x2)) ∧ PrfS(p2(x1, x2), p∀x δ(x, t2(x1, x2))→ ϕq) ∨
. . .
δ(xk+1, tk(x1, . . . , xk)) ∧ PrfS(pk(x1, . . . , xk), p∀x δ(x, tk(x1, . . . , xk))→ ϕq),
with x1, x2, . . . , xk+1 as free variables. Our aim is to show that EA+ Rfn(S) ⊢ ϕ. We do this by
arguing informally in EA+Rfn(S) and considering cases corresponding to the disjunction above.
Note that by provable Σ1-completeness for each EA-term t(x1, . . . , xk) we have
EA ⊢ ∀x1 . . . ∀xk
(
✷S(t(x1, . . . , xk)↔ t(x1, . . . , xk))
)
.
This allows to replace occurrences of the form ti(x1, . . . , xi) under ✷S with ti(x1, . . . , xi).
For i ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1} let us denote by Ci(x1, . . . , xi) the following elementary formula
δ(xi, ti−1(x1, . . . , xi−1)) ∧ PrfS(pi−1(x1, . . . , xi−1), p∀x δ(x, ti−1(x1, . . . , xi−1))→ ϕq),
that is, the ith member of the disjunction above.
We start with the first line by considering two cases: ∀x1 C1(x1) and ∃x1 ¬C1(x1). Assume
∀x1 C1(x1), then by the definition of C1(x1) we have ∀x1 δ(x1, t0) and PrfS(p0, p∀x δ(x, t0)→ ϕq).
The latter formula clearly implies ✷S(∀x δ(x, t0)→ ϕ). Since t0 is a closed term we can use Rfn(S)
to get ∀x δ(x, t0)→ ϕ, hence we obtain ϕ.
Conversely, assume ∃x1¬C1(x1). Using ∆0(exp)-induction we can find the least element,
denote it by c1, satisfying ¬C1(x). In other words, c1 is the unique element satisfying the
following elementary formula
D1(x) := ¬C1(x) ∧ ∀y < xC1(y),
and clearly, EA ⊢ ∀x, y (D1(x) ∧D1(y) → x = y). By provable Σ1-completeness D1(c1) implies
✷SD1(c1). Also by its definition c1 falsifies the first line of the disjuction.
Now we substitute c1 for x1 in the disjunction above and consider two cases for the second
line in the same way as for the first one. Namely, assume ∀x2 C2(c1, x2), that is, ∀x2 δ(x2, t1(c1))
and PrfS(p1(c1), p∀x δ(x, t1(c1))→ ϕq). The second formula implies ✷S(∀x δ(x, t1(c1))→ ϕ).
We want to show
✷S (∀y (D1(y)→ (∀x δ(x, t1(y))→ ϕ))) . (4)
Indeed, arguing in S:
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Assume D1(y). By D1(c1) and the uniqueness of c1 we get y = c1. But then
∀x δ(x, t1(c1))→ ϕ implies ∀x δ(x, t1(y))→ ϕ, as required.
Using Rfn(S) from (4) we obtain ∀y (D1(y)→ (∀x δ(x, t1(y))→ ϕ)). Instantiating y = c1 we get
D1(c1)→ (∀x δ(x, t1(c1))→ ϕ), which, together with D1(c1) and ∀x δ(x, t1(c1)) implies ϕ.
Now, assume ∃x2¬C2(c1, x2). We proceed in the same way as above. Namely, by ∆0(exp)-
induction there exists the least x satisfying ¬C2(c1, x), denote it by c2. The pair (c1, c2) satisfies
the following elementary formula
D2(x, y) := ¬C2(x, y) ∧ ∀z < y C1(x, z),
and as above we have S ⊢ ∀x, y, z (D2(z, x)∧D2(z, y)→ x = y). Together c1 and c2 falsify the first
two lines of the disjunction. Also by provable Σ1-completeness D2(c1, c2) implies ✷SD2(c1, c2).
We continue considering two cases for each line of the disjunction. If ∀xi Ci(c1, . . . , ci−1, xi), at
first we eliminate the occurrences of c1, . . . , ci−1 under ✷S by moving their elementary definitions
under it as was done above. Then we apply Rfn(S), obtaining a sentence of the form
∀x1 . . . ∀xi (D1(x1) ∧ · · · ∧Di(x1, . . . , xi)→ (∀x δ(x, ti(x1, . . . , xi)→ ϕ)),
take x1 = c1, . . . , xi = ci respectively, and derive ϕ using hypotheses.
Conversely, if ∃xi¬Ci(c1, . . . , ci−1, xi), we define a new element ci as the least x satisfying
¬Ci(c1, . . . , ci−1, x), which, together with previously defined c1, . . . , ci−1, falsifies the first i lines
of the disjunction.
We proceed in this fashion by successively falsifying the lines. Since the whole disjunction is
provable, it cannot be that all the lines are falsified, hence for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k+1} it must be
the case that ∀xi Ci(c1, . . . , ci−1, xi). But in this case we derive ϕ, as required.
5 Provable 1-provability for extensions of EA
In this section we study the case of an arbitrary theory T and n = 1. The main result of the
section is Theorem 1, which characterizes the theory CS(T ) in terms of a theory S and the
Σ02-ordinal of a theory T .
We start by reducing the problem of axiomatizing CS(T ) for an arbitrary arithmetical theory
T to the case of EA, which has been dealt with in the previous section. Note that since [1]Sϕ is
a Σ2-formula, the theory CS(T ) depends only on the Σ2-consequences of T . Σ2-consequences of
the fragments of PA were studied in [6].
Let us define ω0 := ω, ωn+1 := ω
ωn for n < ω and ε0 = sup{ωn | n < ω}. We fix some natural
ordinal notation system for ordinals α < ε0 and its presentation in arithmetic. Whenever we
mention these ordinals in a formal context, we assume that this particular ordinal notation
system is being used.
Assume an elementary well-ordering (D,≺) is fixed. The Σ02-ordinal of a theory T was defined
in [6] in terms of the iterations of the local Σ2-reflection schema over EA as follows:
|T |Σ0
2
:= sup{α ∈ D | RfnΣ2(EA)α ⊆ T },
where as usual we assume |T |Σ0
2
:=∞ if the inclusion holds for all α ∈ D.
A theory T is said to be Σ02-regular, if there is an α ∈ D such that
T ≡Σ2 RfnΣ2(EA)α.
Theories IΣn were shown in [6] to be regular w.r.t. the natural ordinal notation system for ε0.
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Lemma 5.1. Σ2-consequences of IΣn are axiomatized by RfnΣ2(EA)ωn for n > 0.
It follows that CS(IΣn) ≡ CS(RfnΣ2(EA)ωn). But also by [3, Proposition 5.2] we have
∀αRfnΣ2(T )α ≡Σ2 Rfn(T )α provably in EA, whence CS(IΣn) ≡ CS(Rfn(EA)ωn). Therefore we
now focus on characterizing theories of the form CS(Rfn(EA)α).
The following lemma shows that transfinite iterations of the local reflection principle along an
arbitrary elementary well-ordering (D,≺) and the CS(·) operator can be permuted. This allows
us to reduce the characterization of CS(Rfn(EA)α) to that of CS(EA).
Lemma 5.2. Provably in EA, ∀αCS(Rfn(T )α) ≡ Rfn(CS(T ))α.
Proof. We give an informal argument by reflexive induction on α in EA. The case α = 0 is
trivial, so we can assume α 6= 0. Denote Rfn(T )α and Rfn(CS(T ))α by T
α and Uα respectively.
We split the proof into two parts:
(i) ∀αUα ⊆ CS(T
α).
(ii) ∀αCS(T
α) ⊆ Uα.
(i) Assume Uα ⊢ ϕ. By the definition of Uα and the formalized deduction theorem there
exist sentences ψ1, . . . , ψm and β ≺ α such that
Uβ ⊢
m∧
i=1
(✷Uβψi → ψi)→ ϕ.
By Σ1-completeness we have
EA ⊢ ✷Uβ
(
m∧
i=1
(✷Uβψi → ψi)→ ϕ
)
.
The reflexive induction hypothesis for β can be rewritten as
EA ⊢ ∀ψ (✷Uβψ → ✷Tβ [1]Sψ) ,
hence
EA ⊢ ✷Tβ [1]S
(
m∧
i=1
(✷Uβψi → ψi)→ ϕ
)
.
This implies
T + Rfn(T β) ⊢ [1]S
(
m∧
i=1
(✷Uβψi → ψi)→ ϕ
)
.
We will show that for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we have
T + Rfn(T β) ⊢ [1]S (✷Uβψi → ψi) .
Combining it with the previous derivation, we get T β+1 ⊢ [1]Sϕ, hence T
α ⊢ [1]Sϕ, as required.
Fix some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Using the reflexive induction hypothesis we derive
T + Rfn(T β) ⊢ ✷Uβψi → ✷Tβ [1]Sψi
→ ✷Tβ [1]S(✷Uβψi → ψi)
→ [1]S(✷Uβψi → ψi).
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But since ¬✷Uβψi is a Π1-sentence, we have
EA ⊢ ¬✷Uβψi → [1]S (¬✷Uβψi)
→ [1]S(✷Uβψi → ψi),
that yields T + Rfn(T β) ⊢ [1]Sϕ.
(ii) Assume Tα ⊢ [1]Sϕ. By the definition of T
α and the formalized deduction theorem there
exist sentences ψ1, . . . , ψn and β ≺ α such that
T β ⊢
m∧
i=1
(✷Tβψi → ψi)→ [1]Sϕ. (5)
Our aim is to show that for any subset I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} it holds that
U + Rfn(Uβ) ⊢
(∧
i∈I
¬✷Tβψi ∧
∧
i/∈I
✷Tβψi
)
→ ϕ, (6)
whence U + Rfn(Uβ) ⊢ ϕ follows by considering all 2m cases, hence Uα ⊢ ϕ, as required.
Firstly, let us show that for any I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} we have
T β ⊢
∧
i∈I
(✷Tβψi → ψi)→ [1]Sϕ =⇒ T
β ⊢ [1]S
([∧
i∈I
¬✷Tβψi
]
→ ϕ
)
. (7)
Indeed, for each i we have T β ⊢ ¬✷Tβψi → (✷Tβψi → ψi), so by the premise of (7) we get
T β ⊢
[∧
i∈I
¬✷Tβψi
]
→
∧
i∈I
(✷Tβψi → ψi)
→ [1]Sϕ
→ [1]S
([∧
i∈I
¬✷Tβψi
]
→ ϕ
)
.
Using provable Σ1-completeness for [1]S we derive
T β ⊢
[∨
i∈I
✷Tβψi
]
→ [1]S
(∨
i∈I
✷Tβψi
)
→ [1]S
([∧
i∈I
¬✷Tβψi
]
→ ϕ
)
,
that yields the conclusion of (7). Moreover, this argument can be formalized in EA, so for each
subset I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} we have
EA ⊢ ✷Tβ
(∧
i∈I
(✷Tβψi → ψi)→ [1]Sϕ
)
→ ✷Tβ [1]S
([∧
i∈I
¬✷Tβψi
]
→ ϕ
)
. (8)
Now, fix some I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. For each i we have T β ⊢ ψi → (✷Tβψi → ψi), whence
T β ⊢
∧
i/∈I
ψi →
∧
i/∈I
(✷Tβψi → ψi).
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Using this and (5) we derive
T β ⊢
∧
i/∈I
ψi →
(∧
i∈I
(✷Tβψi → ψi)→ [1]Sϕ
)
.
By Σ1-completeness this implies
EA ⊢ ✷Tβ
∧
i/∈I
ψi → ✷Tβ
(∧
i∈I
(✷Tβψi → ψi)→ [1]Sϕ
)
.
We use (8) to obtain
EA ⊢ ✷Tβ
∧
i/∈I
ψi → ✷Tβ [1]S
([∧
i∈I
¬✷Tβψi
]
→ ϕ
)
.
By the reflexive induction hypothesis for β we have
EA ⊢ ✷Tβ [1]S
([∧
i∈I
¬✷Tβψi
]
→ ϕ
)
→ ✷Uβ
([∧
i∈I
¬✷Tβψi
]
→ ϕ
)
,
whence
EA ⊢ ✷Tβ
∧
i/∈I
ψi → ✷Uβ
([∧
i∈I
¬✷Tβψi
]
→ ϕ
)
.
Finally, this yields
U + Rfn(Uβ) ⊢ ✷Tβ
∧
i/∈I
ψi →
([∧
i∈I
¬✷Tβψi
]
→ ϕ
)
,
and since
EA ⊢
(
✷Tβ
∧
i/∈I
ψi
)
↔
(∧
i/∈I
✷Tβψi
)
we obtain (6).
Now we are ready to state and prove a general result characterizing the theory CS(T ) in
terms of the Σ02-ordinal of T and iterated local reflection over S.
Theorem 1. If T is a Σ02-regular theory with |T |Σ02 = α, then CS(T ) ≡ Rfn(S)1+α.
Proof. By the discussion preceding Lemma 5.2 and the hypothesis we have
CS(T ) ≡ CS(RfnΣ2(EA)α) ≡ CS(Rfn(EA)α).
Using Lemmas 4.1 and 5.2 we obtain the following chain of equivalences
CS(T ) ≡ CS(Rfn(EA)α) ≡ Rfn(CS(EA))α ≡ Rfn(S + Rfn(S))α ≡ Rfn(S)1+α.
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Note that the equivalences stated in Lemmas 4.1 and 5.2 are provable in EA+. It follows that
if the theory is Σ02-regular provably in EA
+, then the conclusion of Theorem 1 is also provable
in EA+.
Now we obtain several corollaries characterizing the theories CS(T ) for various fragments of
PA.
Corollary 5.3. For all n > 0 provably in EA+ we have CS(IΣn) ≡ Rfn(S)ωn .
Proof. Due to the Lemma 5.1 we can apply Theorem 1 with α = ωn. We get the required result
since 1 + ωn = ωn for n > 0. It can be seen that the proof of Lemma 5.1 can be formalized in
EA
+, whence the result about EA+-provability of the equivalence follows.
In particular, we answer the question concerning C1
PA
(PA) raised in the introduction.
Corollary 5.4. Provably in EA+, CS(PA) ≡ Rfn(S)ε0 .
Using well-known conservation results we can also characterize the theories CS(T ) for param-
eter free induction schemata.
Corollary 5.5. For all n > 0 we have CS(IΣ
−
n ) ≡ CS(IΠ
−
n+1) ≡ Rfn(S)ωn .
Proof. By [3, Proposition 7.6] we have the following conservation results
IΣn ≡Σn+2 IΣ
−
n ≡B(Σn+1) IΠ
−
n+1.
Since n > 0, these three theories have the same Σ2-consequences, hence
CS(IΣn) ≡ CS(IΣ
−
n ) ≡ CS(IΠ
−
n+1).
The result now follows from Corollary 5.3.
The next corollary covers the exceptional case of the theory IΠ−1 .
Corollary 5.6. CS(IΠ
−
1 ) ≡ Rfn(S)2.
Proof. By [2, Theorem 3] we have EA+ + IΠ−1 ≡ EA
+ + RfnΣ2(EA). Since EA
+ ≡ EA+ 〈1〉EA⊤,
Corollary 3.3 implies that
CS(IΠ
−
1 ) ≡ CS(EA
+ + IΠ−1 ) ≡ CS(EA
+ + RfnΣ2(EA)) ≡ CS(EA+ RfnΣ2(EA)) ≡ Rfn(S)2,
where the last equivalence is due to Theorem 1.
The following corollary shows how to compute the Π01-ordinal for the theories CEA(T ) from
the Σ02-ordinal of T .
Corollary 5.7. If T is a Σ02-regular theory |T |Σ02 = α, then |CEA(T )|Π01 = ω
1+α.
Proof. By [3, Proposition 6.2] we have ∀β Rfn(EA)β ≡Π1 EAωβ . Applying Theorem 1 and this
fact with β = 1 + α we get
CEA(T ) ≡ Rfn(EA)1+α ≡Π1 EAω1+α .
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6 Relativization
In this section we generalize the results obtained in previous sections to the notion of n-provability
for n > 1. The results concerning Σ2-conservativity mentioned in the discussion before Lemma
5.2 have the corresponding relativizations to the case of Σn+2-formulas. In particular, by the
results of [6] we have the following
Lemma 6.1. Σn+2-consequences of IΣm are axiomatized by Rfn
n
Σn+2(EA)ωm−n for 0 6 n < m.
By the relativization of [3, Proposition 5.2] we have ∀αRfnnΣn+2(T )α ≡Σn+2 Rfn
n(T )α provably
in EA. Since [n+ 1]Sϕ is a Σn+2-formula, we obtain the analogous chain of equalities
Cn+1S (IΣm) ≡ C
n+1
S (Rfn
n
Σn+2(EA)ωm−n) ≡ C
n+1
S (Rfn
n(EA)ωm−n).
These facts allow us to use the same line of the argument as in the previous sections. We focus on
the theories of the form Cn+1S (Rfn
n(EA)) and reduce their characterization to that of Cn+1S (EA).
The following lemma is the relativized version of Lemma 5.2.
Lemma 6.2. Provably in EA, Cn+1S (Rfn
n(T )α) ≡ Rfn
n(Cn+1S (T ))α.
Proof. The proof is obtained by the straightforward relativization of the proof of Lemma 5.2
but with minor modifications. Namely, one need to show that the reflexive induction hypothesis
implies its relativized versions:
EA ⊢ ∀ψ ([n]Uβψ → [n]Tβ [n+ 1]Sψ) , (9)
EA ⊢ ∀ψ ([n]Tβ [n+ 1]Sψ → [n]Uβψ) . (10)
We argue informally in EA. To prove (9) assume Uβ ⊢ pi → ψ for some true Πn-sentence pi.
Then by the reflexive induction hypothesis T β ⊢ [n+ 1]S(pi → ψ), and hence T
β ⊢ [n+ 1]Spi →
[n + 1]Sψ. But by provable Σn+2-completeness we have EA ⊢ pi → [n + 1]Spi, which implies
T β ⊢ pi → [n+ 1]Sψ, as required.
To prove (10) assume T β ⊢ pi → [n+1]Sψ for some true Πn-sentence pi. By Σn+2-completeness
we have EA ⊢ ¬pi → [n+ 1]S¬pi. Both ψ and ¬pi imply pi → ψ and hence T
β ⊢ [n+ 1]S(pi → ψ).
By the reflexive induction hypothesis we then obtain Uβ ⊢ pi → ψ.
We present two proofs of the relativized version of Lemma 4.1. Firstly, we give a model-
theoretic proof.
Lemma 6.3. Cn+1S (EA) ⊆ EA+ Rfn
n(S).
Proof. Assume EA ⊢ [n + 1]Sϕ for some ϕ. We will show that ϕ is true in every model of
EA + Rfnn(S). Fix an arbitrary M |= EA + Rfnn(S) and note that M |= IΣ−n since IΣ
−
n ≡
EA + RfnnΣn+1(EA) by [3, Theorem 1]. It is known that if M |= IΣ
−
n , then K
n+1(M) ≺Σn+1 M
for n > 0 (see Remark (i) after [11, Theorem 2.1]), and also Kn+1(M) |= EA, where Kn+1(M)
is the substructure of M consisting of all Σn+1-definable elements (without parameters).
Since EA ⊢ [n+1]Sϕ it follows that K
n+1(M) |= [n+1]Sϕ, that is, ∃a ∈ K
n+1(M) such that
Kn+1(M) |= TrueΠn+1(a) ∧ ✷S(TrueΠn+1(a)→ ϕ).
The formula above is Πn+1 ∧ Σ1 and hence by K
n+1(M) ≺Σn+1 M we have
M |= TrueΠn+1(a) ∧ ✷S(TrueΠn+1(a)→ ϕ), (11)
Fix some Σn+1-formula σ(x) defining a, that is,M |= ∃!xσ(x)∧σ(a). Assume σ(x) = ∃y pi(x, y),
where pi(x, y) is Πn, and consider the following formula
δ(z) := pi((z)0, (z)1) ∧ ∀y < z ¬pi((y)0, (y)1),
where (z)0 and (z)1 are the components of the pair coded by z. By M |= ∃xσ(x) we obtain
M |= ∃z pi((z)0, (z)1). But since pi((z)0, (z)1) is Πn we get M |= ∃z δ(z) by using LΠ
−
n (due to
[11, Proposition 1.4]).
We fix some c ∈M such that M |= δ(c) and note that, in particular, M |= pi((c)0, (c)1), and
henceM |= σ((c)0) by the definition of σ(x). But thenM |= (c)0 = a since σ(x) defines a. Thus,
(11) can be rewritten as
M |= TrueΠn+1((c)0) ∧ ✷S(TrueΠn+1((c)0)→ ϕ). (12)
In case n = 0 the formula δ(z) is bounded and we take γ(z) := δ(z). If n > 0 denote by δ˜(z) the
following formula
pi((z)0, (z)1) ∧ ∃u ∀y < z ∃v < uψ(y, v),
where ¬pi((y)0, (y)1) is ∃uψ(y, u) with ψ(u, y) in Πn−1. This formula is seen to be EA-equivalent
to some Σn+1-formula, that is, there exists γ(z) in Σn+1 such that EA ⊢ ∀z (γ(z)↔ δ˜(z)). Using
the corresponding collection axiom as in [11, Proposition 1.7] we obtain M |= ∀z (δ˜(z) ↔ δ(z))
and hence M |= ∀z (γ(z)↔ δ(z)). In particular, M |= γ(c).
Since γ(z) is in Σn+1 we get M |= [n]Sγ(c) by provable Σn+1-completeness and hence M |=
[n]Sδ(c), because by logic we have EA ⊢ ∀z (δ˜(z)→ δ(z)) and so EA ⊢ ∀z (γ(z)→ δ(z)). Also by
the definition of δ(z) we clearly have
EA ⊢ ∀x, y (δ(x) ∧ δ(y)→ x = y). (13)
Let us show that
M |= [n]S
(
∀y (δ(y)→ (TrueΠn+1((y)0)→ ϕ))
)
. (14)
Indeed, arguing under [n]S insideM assume δ(y). Since we also have δ(c), using (13) we conclude
that y = c. But by (12) we have TrueΠn+1((c)0)→ ϕ and hence TrueΠn+1((y)0)→ ϕ, as required.
We apply Rfnn(S) to (14) and obtain
M |= ∀y (δ(y)→ (TrueΠn+1((y)0)→ ϕ)).
In particular, we haveM |= δ(c)→ (TrueΠn+1((c)0)→ ϕ)). Combining it with (12) andM |= δ(c)
we get M |= ϕ.
In order to have the result provable in EA+ as in the case of 1-provability we also give a
syntactic proof that can be formalized in EA+.
Lemma 6.4. Provably in EA+, Cn+1S (EA) ⊆ IΣn + Rfn
n(S).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.1 and is based on the application of Herbrand’s
theorem. In order to apply Herbrand’s theorem we reduce the problem to the case of Σ2-formulas
by adapting the method from [1, Theorem 4]. At first, let us consider the case n = 1. Assume
ϕ ∈ C2S(EA), that is, EA ⊢ [2]Sϕ. Let ∀x∃y δ(x, y, z), where δ(x, y, z) is a bounded formula, be
a Π2-formula that is EA-equivalent to TrueΠ2(z), then by the definition of [2]S we have
EA ⊢ ∃z (∀x∃y δ(x, y, z) ∧ ✷S(∀x∃y δ(x, y, z)→ ϕ)). (15)
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Our aim is to eliminate the innermost existential quantifier by introducing a new function symbol
to the language of EA. Let us consider the theory U obtained from EAg, where g is a new function
symbol, by adding the following axiom
∀x∀z 6 x (∃y δ((z)0, y, (z)1)→ ∃y 6 g(x) δ((z)0, y, (z)1)). (16)
By [1, Lemma 9.4] there exists a non-relativizing interpretation (·)− of U in IΣ1 that is
identical on formulas in the language of EA. It follows that (provably in EA) U is conservative
over IΣ1.
The existential quantifier in the formula ∃y δ(x, y, z) can be bounded in U using axiom (16),
and the function that gives the least witness for this quantifier is elementary in g. It follows that
this function can be defined by some EAg-term g′(x, z) such that
U ⊢ ∃y δ(x, y, z)↔ δ(x, g′(x, z), z). (17)
Using (15) and (17) we get
U ⊢ ∃p ∃z ∀x (δ(x, g′(x, z), z) ∧ PrfS(p, p∀x∃y δ(x, y, z)→ ϕq)).
Now, since U has Πg1-axiomatization and the formula above is Σ
g
2 we are able to apply a version
of Herbrand’s theorem for Σ2-formulas. Let us denote by C(x, z, p) the following formula
δ(x, g′(x, z), z) ∧ PrfS(p, p∀x∃y δ(x, y, z)→ ϕq))).
By Herbrand’s theorem we get a sequence of EAg-terms p0, t0, p1(x1), t1(x1), . . . , pk(x1, . . . , xk),
tk(x1, . . . , xk) such that the following disjunction is provable in U :
C(x1, t0, p0) ∨ C(x2, t1(x1), p1(x1)) ∨ · · · ∨ C(xk+1, tk(x1, . . . , xk), pk(x1, . . . , xk))
with x1, x2, . . . , xk+1 as free variables.
By applying (17), weakening PrfS to ✷S and rewriting occurrences of terms t0, t1(x1), . . . ,
tk(x1, . . . , xk) using existential quantifiers we obtain
U ⊢∃u0 ∀x1
(
(∃y δ(x1, y, u0) ∧ u0 = t0 ∧ ✷S(∀x∃y δ(x, y, u0)→ ϕ)) ∨
∃u1∀x2
(
(∃y δ(x2, y, u1) ∧ u1 = t1(x1) ∧✷S(∀x∃y δ(x, y, u1)→ ϕ)) ∨
. . .
∃uk∀xk+1
(
(∃y δ(xk+1, y, uk) ∧ uk = tk(x1, . . . , xk) ∧ ✷S(∀x∃y δ(x, y, uk)→ ϕ))
)
. . .
)
.
Let us consider the case k = 1. We apply the interpretation and obtain
IΣ1 ⊢ ∃u0 ∀x1
( (
∃y δ(x1, y, u0) ∧ (u0 = t0)
− ∧ ✷S(∀x∃y δ(x, y, u0)→ ϕ)
)
∨
∃u1∀x2
((
∃y δ(x2, y, u1) ∧ (u1 = t1(x1))
− ∧ ✷S(∀x∃y δ(x, y, u1)→ ϕ)
)))
.
Note that all (ui = ti(x1, . . . , xi))
− are equivalent to Σ2-formulas in IΣ1. By induction on the
complexity of a EAg-term t(x1, . . . , xm) using [1, Lemma 9.4] for the base case one can show
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x1 . . . ∀xm ∃!u (u = t(x1, . . . , xm))
−. (18)
In particular, this holds for the formulas (ui = ti(x1, . . . , xi))
−.
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Now we argue inside IΣ1 + Rfn
1(IΣ1 + S) as in the proof of Lemma 4.1 by considering cases
corresponding to the disjunction above.
Fix some witness u0 to the first existential quantifier and start from the first line. In case
¬((u0 = t0)
− ∧ ✷S(∀x∃y δ(x, y, u0) → ϕ)) the first line is falsified by any x1, so we fix x1 = 0¯
and move to the second line. Note that we are happen to be in the same position as for the first
line, and we can apply the same reasoning.
So assume (u0 = t0)
− ∧✷S(∀x∃y δ(x, y, u0)→ ϕ). In this case we also consider two possibil-
ities. Suppose ∀x1 ∃y δ(x1, y, u0). By provable Σ2-completeness we get [1]IΣ1+S(u0 = t0)
−. Also
by the assumption we have ✷S(∀x∃y δ(x, y, u0)→ ϕ).
We claim that [1]IΣ1+S (∀v0 ((v0 = t0)
− → (∀x∃y δ(x, y, v0)→ ϕ))). We argue under [1]IΣ1+S :
Assume (v0 = t0)
−. By (u0 = t0)
− and (18) we get v0 = u0, whence ∀x∃y δ(x, y, v0)→ ϕ
since ∀x∃y δ(x, y, u0)→ ϕ.
Applying Rfn1(IΣ1 + S) we get ∀v0 ((v0 = t0)
− → (∀x∃y δ(x, y, v0)→ ϕ)). By taking v0 = u0
and using hypotheses we obtain ϕ.
Conversely, assume ∃x1 ∀y¬δ(x1, y, u0). Let B(u0, x1) be the formula asserting that x1 is the
least element satisfying ∀y ¬δ(x1, y, u0). Using LΠ1 we find such x1 and denote it by c1. Note
that B(u0, x1) is of the form Π1 ∧ ∀
bΣ1, hence it is IΣ1-equivalent to Σ2-formula by using BΣ1.
Also we clearly have
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀u ∀x∀y (B(u, x) ∧B(u, y)→ x = y).
The elements u0 and c1 together falsify the first line. We fix them and move to the second line.
Fix a witness u1 for the second existential quantifier (with x1 replaced by c1). In our case
(k = 1) it must be that
∀x2 ∃y δ(x2, y, u1) ∧ (u1 = t1(c1))
− ∧ ✷S(∀x∃y δ(x, y, u1)→ ϕ). (19)
Using provable Σ2-completeness we obtain [1]IΣ1+S((u0 = t0)
− ∧B(u0, c1) ∧ (u1 = t1(c1))
−).
We claim that
[1]IΣ1+S
(
∀v0 ∀v1 ∀d1
(
(v0 = t0)
− ∧B(v0, d1) ∧ (v1 = t1(d1))
− → (∀x∃y δ(x, y, v1)→ ϕ)
))
.
We argue under [1]IΣ1+S as follows:
Assume (v0 = t0)
−∧B(v0, d1)∧ (v1 = t1(d1))
−. The first hypothesis implies v0 = u0,
whence the second hypothesis implies d1 = c1, so v1 = u1 by the third hypothesis.
By the assumption (19) we get ∀x∃y δ(x, y, v1)→ ϕ.
Using Rfn1(IΣ1 + S), taking v0 = u0, v1 = u1, d1 = c1 and applying the hypotheses we derive ϕ.
The proof for k > 1 is no different. It goes along the same lines as the proof of Lemma 4.1
but with the appropriate modifications as it was done above for the case k = 1.
Finally, since IΣ1 is finitely axiomatizable we have IΣ1 + Rfn
1(S) ⊢ Rfn1(IΣ1 + S). Indeed,
denote by ψ the conjunction of all axioms of IΣ1. By the formalized deduction theorem we get
IΣ1 + Rfn
1(S) ⊢ [1]IΣ1+Sθ → [1]S(ψ → θ)
→ (ψ → θ),
and we obtain IΣ1 + Rfn
1(S) ⊢ [1]IΣ1+Sθ → θ since IΣ1 ⊢ ψ. Hence IΣ1 + Rfn
1(S) ⊢ ϕ.
A proof for an arbitrary n > 1 is essentially the same, but now we use [1, Lemma 9.6] and
[1, Lemma 9.7] to get the interpretation (·)− and to show that TrueΠn+1(z) is equivalent to some
Πg1,...,gn1 -formula. The formulas (ui = ti(x1, . . . , xi))
− are equivalent to Σn+1-formulas in IΣn
and hence we get [n]IΣn+S instead of [1]IΣ1+S in the last part of the argument because we apply
provable Σn+1-completeness instead of Σ2-completeness.
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Note that, while Lemmas 3.5 and 6.3 give the equivalence Cn+1S (EA) ≡ S +Rfn
n(S) for all S
extending EA, in order to have it provable in EA+ we need S to be as strong as IΣn due to the
Lemma 6.4. Hence we get the following analog of Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 6.5. Cn+1S (EA) ≡ S +Rfn
n(S). Moreover, if S extends IΣn this equivalence is provable
in EA+.
Using Lemmas 6.2 and 6.5 we obtain the relativizations of the main results of the previous
section. The notion of the Σ0n+2-ordinal of a theory T and of a Σ
0
n+2-regular theory are defined
analogously.
Theorem 2. If T is a Σ0n+2-regular theory with |T |Σ0n+2 = α, then C
n+1
S (T ) ≡ Rfn
n(S)1+α.
Again if Σ0n+2-regularity of T is provable in EA
+ and S extends IΣn, the equivalence stated
in Theorem 2 is provable in EA+. This theorem together with Lemma 6.1 imply the following
Corollary 6.6. For all 0 6 n < m we have Cn+1S (IΣm) ≡ Rfn(S)ωm−n .
Corollary 6.7. Cn+1S (PA) ≡ Rfn
n(S)ε0 .
We also obtain the analogues of Corollaries 5.5 and 5.6.
Corollary 6.8. For all 0 6 n < m we have Cn+1S (IΣ
−
m) ≡ C
n+1
S (IΠ
−
m+1) ≡ Rfn(S)ωm−n .
Corollary 6.9. Cn+1S (IΠ
−
n+1) ≡ Rfn
n(S)2 for n > 0.
Proof. By [2, Theorem 1] we have IΠ−n+1 ≡ EA+ Rfn
n
Σn+2(EA) for n > 0. The result now follows
by Theorem 2.
7 Speed-up results
Theorem 1 implies that the theories CEA(EA) and EA+ Rfn(EA) are deductively equivalent and
this equivalence is provable in EA+. In this section we prove a speed-up result, which shows that
it is in some sense easier to prove 1-provability of a formula in EA rather than to find a proof of
this formula in EA+ Rfn(EA).
Namely, we show that CEA(EA) has superexponential speed-up over EA + Rfn(EA), that is,
there is a sequence of sentences ϕn, a polynomial p(n) and a constant ε > 0 such that for each
n there is an EA-proof of [1]EAϕn of size p(n) and there is no EA + Rfn(EA)-proof of ϕn of size
less than (21n)
ε. In particular, there is no elementary function f(x) such that f(p) codes an
EA+ Rfn(EA)-proof of ϕ, whenever p codes an EA-proof of [1]EAϕ for some ϕ.
Our strategy to obtain the result is reflected in the following schema.
CEA(EA) ≡ EA+ Rfn(EA)
≡Π1 ≡Π1
EA
+ ≡Π1 EAω
The following two lemmas show that the vertical equivalences in the above schema are prov-
able in EA. Moreover, they produce the functions effecting the proof-transformation.
Lemma 7.1. EA ⊢ ∀pi ∈ Π1 (✷EA+pi ↔ ✷EA[1]EApi).
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Proof. Arguing in EA assume EA+ ⊢ pi for some Π1-sentence pi. It follows that EA ⊢ 〈1〉EA⊤ → pi,
whence EA ⊢ 〈1〉EA⊤ → [1]EApi by provable Σ2-completeness. But clearly EA ⊢ [1]EA⊥ → [1]EApi,
so EA ⊢ [1]EApi.
Conversely, assume EA ⊢ [1]EApi for some Π1-sentence pi. We derive
EA ⊢ ¬pi → [1]EA¬pi ∧ [1]EApi
→ [1]EA⊥,
whence EA+ ≡ EA+ 〈1〉EA⊤ ⊢ pi.
For a proof of the next lemma we refer to [3, Proposition 6.1].
Lemma 7.2. EA ⊢ ∀pi ∈ Π1 (✷EA+Rfn(EA)pi ↔ ✷EAωpi).
It follows from the proof of Lemma 7.1 that there is a polynomially bounded function f1(x)
that, given an EA+-proof p of a Π1-sentence pi, transforms it into an EA-proof f(p) of [1]EApi.
Similarly, there is an elementary function f2(x) that acts the same relative to the pair of theories
EA+Rfn(EA) and EAω. The following lemma shows that there is no such an elementary function
for the pair of theories EA+ and EAω.
Lemma 7.3. EA+ has superexponential speed-up over EAω w.r.t. Π1-sentences.
Proof. We will show that EA+ proves the consistency of EAω on some cut in EA
+, whence
the result follows by mimicking the proof of [15, Theorem 4.2]. Namely, one can take ϕn :=
ConEAω(2
1
n), where ConEAω (x) is the formalization of “there is no EAω-proof of contradiction of
size 6 x”.
Define the formula J(x) := Con(EAx). We claim that J(x) is the required cut in EA
+. Indeed,
EA
+ ⊢ J(0) ∧ ∀y 6 x (J(x)→ J(y)) is trivial. Now we show that
EA
+ ⊢ ∀x (J(x)→ J(x+ 1)).
Using the fact that EAx+1 ≡ EA+ Con(EAx) and EA
+ ≡ EA+ 〈1〉EA⊤, we derive
EA
+ ⊢ ¬Con(EAx+1)→ ✷EA(¬Con(EAx))
→ ¬Con(EAx),
that is, EA+ ⊢ ¬J(x + 1)→ ¬J(x), whence EA+ ⊢ J(x)→ J(x+ 1).
Furthermore, we have
EA ⊢ ∀x (J(x)→ ConEAω (x)).
Reasoning in EA assume that some y 6 x codes an EAω-proof of a contradiction. By the
definition of EAω the number y must code a proof of contradiction in EAz+1 for some z (namely,
the maximal number k such that the axiom Con(EAk) is used in the proof coded by y). In
particular, EAz+1 is inconsistent. By the definition of z the proof coded by y should contain
the axiom Con(EAz), and since z 6 pz¯q 6 pCon(EAz¯)q we have z < y 6 x. In this case the
inconsistency of EAz+1 implies the inconsistency of EAx, whence ¬Con(EAx), that is, ¬J(x).
Theorem 3. CEA(EA) has superexponential speed-up over EA+ Rfn(EA).
Proof. By Lemma 7.3 there is a sequence of bounded sentences ϕn with short EA
+-proofs and long
EAω-proofs in a sense of the definition of speed-up. We claim that this sequence also witnesses
the superexponential speed-up of CEA(EA) over EA+Rfn(EA), since the functions f1(x) and f2(x)
preserve the bounds from the definition of speed-up.
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Indeed, the sentences ϕn have short CEA(EA)-proofs by transforming their short EA
+-proofs
via f1(x), which is polynomially bounded. However, if there were short proofs of these sentences
in EA+Rfn(EA) then we could transform them via the function f2(x), which is multiexponentially
bounded, into short EAω-proofs, contradicting Lemma 7.3.
We also prove the generalizations of the previous results.
Lemma 7.4. For all n > 0 and m > 0 we have
EA ⊢ ∀pi ∈ Π1 (✷IΣmpi → ✷IΣm [n+ 1]EApi).
Proof. We have EA ⊢ ∀pi ∈ Π1 (✷IΣm(pi → [n+ 1]EApi)) by provable Σn+1-completeness, whence
the result follows.
The following lemma is [3, Proposition 6.2].
Lemma 7.5. For any n > 0 we have
EA ⊢ ∀α ≻ 0 ∀pi ∈ Π1 (✷Rfnn(EA)αpi ↔ ✷(EA)nωαpi).
Lemma 7.6. IΣn has superexponential speed-up over (EA)
n
ω w.r.t. Π1-sentences.
Proof. Essentially the same as that of Lemma 7.3, but with J(x) := n-Con((EA)nx) and using
that IΣn ≡ EA+ 〈n+ 1〉EA⊤.
Theorem 4. Cn+1
EA
(IΣn) has superexponential speed-up over EA+ Rfn
n(EA).
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Theorem 3 by using the previous lemmas.
Corollary 7.7. CEA(IΣn) has superexponential speed-up over Rfn(EA)ωn .
Proof. All the inclusions in the following chain are provable in EA
IΣn ⊆Π1 CEA(IΣn) ≡ Rfn(EA)ωn ⊆Π1 EAωn+1 ⊆ (EA)
1
ωn ⊆ · · · ⊆ (EA)
n
ω.
Indeed, for the inclusion IΣn ⊆Π1 CEA(IΣn) it follows from Lemma 7.4, for Rfn(EA)ωn ⊆Π1 EAωn+1
it follows from Lemma 7.5. As for the rest, it can be seen from the proof of [3, Theorem 3] that
the corresponding inclusions can be proved in EA.
It follows that there are corresponding elementary, hence multiexponentially bounded, func-
tions effecting the proof transformation and for the first inclusion we obtain a polynomially
bounded function from the proof of Lemma 7.4. The rest of the proof is exactly the same as in
Theorem 3, but now using Lemma 7.6.
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